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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DCI/IC 73-0126

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

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Office of the Director

2 March 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the NSCIC Working Group

SUBJECT: Case Study: The Arab-Israeli Ceasefire of 1970

1. Enclosed is a copy of The Arab-Israeli Ceasefire of 1970, prepared at the request of the Working Group by an interagency task force. This is the third study of this nature conducted under the aegis of the group. The first, Intelligence Support in Political-Military Crises: A Case Study of the India-Pakistan Crisis of 1971, was forwarded to the NSCIC on 5 October 1972 with a memorandum suggesting problem areas on which NSCIC guidance would be useful. The second, Case Study of the Jordan-Palestinian Fedayeen Conflict, was sent to you for review on 26 February 1973.

2. This is a very useful study, in my view, and the study group is to be commended.

3. Your comments on the study are invited, but I propose that in the consideration of it at the next meeting, date for which has not yet been set, the group focus primarily on specific proposals for follow-on actions, including what additional dissemination would be appropriate.

4. The Arab-Israeli study group posed six questions which it considered the Working Group may wish to discuss:

- How are intelligence needs developed and communicated?
- How good were the intelligence forecasts?
- How effective was interagency coordination?
- How useful is foreign intelligence?
- What were the implications of the ceasefire for arms control and disarmament?
- What does the ceasefire imply for future photo reconnaissance systems?

5. The first three of these also were posed in the India-Pakistan and Jordan-Fedayeen studies and the question of the usefulness of foreign intelligence also was raised in the Jordan-Fedayeen report. The Arab-Israeli study is the only one of the three in which the importance of a base line from which to measure violations of cease-fire/force level agreements is stressed.

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